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McLean, H. Gilmore, M.A., Spring 2018

Environmental Philosophy

Experiences of Wildness and Value
Chairperson: Christopher Preston
Philosophers have often failed to think of concepts in terms of how they are actually
experienced. Specifically, two concepts in environmental philosophy, intrinsic value and
wildness, are rarely considered in terms of our experience. Rather, they are often
understood as qualities of a natural place, and not qualities of our experience. This thesis
first advocates the importance of understanding intrinsic value and wildness as
experienced. I then argue for a radical openness in life that can help us experience both
intrinsic value and wildness often, and in places we didn’t expect them before. Our
inability to experience these things is not indicative of their lack, it is indicative of ours.
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Introduction

This paper is about the centrality of human experience and how philosophers have often failed to
think of concepts in terms of how they are actually experienced. Specifically, two concepts in
environmental philosophy, intrinsic value and wildness, are rarely considered in terms of our
experience. Rather, they are often understood as qualities of a natural place, and not qualities of
our experience. This thesis first advocates the importance of understanding intrinsic value and
wildness as experienced. I then argue for a radical openness in life that can help us experience
both intrinsic value and wildness often, and in places we didn’t expect them before. Our inability
to experience these things is not indicative of their lack, it is indicative of ours.
In chapter one of this paper I write about the importance of intrinsic value to philosophy.
Intrinsic value, or the notion that something has value in and of its own right, has been central to
environmental philosophy since its inception. Unresolved questions about whether, when, and
how the natural environment has intrinsic value and what that means for us have obsessed many
well-meaning, nature-loving philosophers.
Recently, several philosophers have claimed that arguments about intrinsic value have
acted more as a hindrance to actually preventing environmental degradation than as a helpful
philosophical underpinning, and that these discussions have stopped being useful (McShane, 910
- 911). One result of this is the argument that the protection of nature should be based wholly on
instrumental, anthropocentric values.
I argue that an experience of intrinsic value, as redefined by Katie McShane, is a
necessary part of environmental philosophy and ethics in general. McShane argues that among
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the many understandings of intrinsic value, the most useful to philosophy is one that takes
intrinsic value to mean a simple claim about how we should care about things. She argues that
we should keep intrinsic value in philosophy because intrinsically valuing is something we
already and always will do. McShane argues that we experience intrinsic value through emotions
and valuing attitudes. This transforms our understanding of intrinsic value from some abstract
metaphysical quality in the world to something that we can actually experience.
In chapter two, I argue that wildness, too, is something that we experience. Our inability
to experience wildness does not indicate its lack. Rather we have preconceived notions about
where it is appropriate to find wildness. This brings to light well-established dualisms between
culture and nature as well as self and non-self. I argue that though these boundaries are
occasionally practical and necessary, they are overstated and harmful to our understanding of
wildness.
Because of these dualisms, philosophers of wildness often champion experiences of
wildness in some places but miss the wildness in other places. Because they defend wildness
mostly as a quality of wilderness and natural areas, they restrict our experiences of wildness to
those places. Wildness, I claim, is an always present, consistent, underlying possibility and the
experience of wildness depends on the observer’s ability to perceive it. I will introduce the
philosophy of Gary Snyder, as it focuses on actively disassembling the dualisms that keep us
separate from an experience of wildness.
In chapter three, I will discuss the implications of intrinsic value and wildness as
experienced and how these experiences can inform our practice. While experiences of intrinsic
value and wildness are considered experiences that demand our attention, this chapter is about
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what it would mean to give this attention freely. It is about paying attention to how we already
experience the world.
I bring in Tom Birch’s practice of universal consideration, which proposes that a basic
consideration and attention should be given to everything. I argue that Birch’s universal
consideration shares much with the practice of Zen Buddhism, which he implicitly and explicitly
refers to. I view Zen through the lens of Snyder, who is not only a firm believer in wildness, but
has been tremendously influenced by Zen and sees a connection between the two.
Zen is far from the only practice that has the capability to help us pay attention to the
world and how we move through it. It is but one among many tools at our disposal for teaching
that attention and cultivating it where it didn’t exist before. To pay this kind of attention to our
lives is not only to see intrinsic value and wildness, but it’s to understand ourselves better and
how we experience the world we live in.
The intrinsic value and wildness we experience in natural areas and wilderness refreshes
and invigorates us. Though these places are incredibly important to preserve, we do both
ourselves and our daily lives a disservice to think such experiences are restricted to those places.
My ultimate goal in this thesis is to give a conceptual and practical way of living and
experiencing our own daily, seemingly mundane lives in a fuller way.

Chapter 1

Since its inception in the 1970s, environmental philosophy has sought a way to explain that the
natural world has intrinsic value, or value independent of instrumental, extrinsic value put on it
by humans. This pursuit has resulted in years of conversation about how best to argue for the
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existence of it. The inconclusive nature of the conversation has led many environmental
philosophers to abandon it as a compelling reason to prevent environmental destruction.
It is not my goal in this paper to prove the existence of intrinsic value. Whether or not
intrinsic value really exists, we tend to experience certain things as intrinsically valuable. This
goes against most intrinsic value theorists, who tend to focus less on our experience of value and
more on its metaphysical status or the moral implications of it.
One exception is Katie McShane. In her article “Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn’t
Give Up on Intrinsic Value,” McShane differentiates four approaches to intrinsic value theory,
claiming that some are more helpful to philosophy than others:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about
the distinctive role that X should play in moral decision making.
Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about
the distinctive way that it makes sense to care about X.
Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about
which properties of X make it valuable.
Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims about
the metaphysical status of X’s value properties (McShane, 47).

She argues that the second category of intrinsic value offers the most promise specifically for
environmental ethics and for ethics in general. In explaining this category, she writes that its
proponents are most interested in differentiating between intrinsic and instrumental values of
something (McShane, 48). According to McShane, if we experience something as intrinsically
valuable versus instrumentally valuable we care about it in a different way.
McShane explains different valuing attitudes as how we experience the value of, that is
care about, certain things. What she is arguing is that we do not and cannot experience intrinsic
value directly as intrinsic value; she writes, “as many of the sentimentalists have pointed out, we
rarely if ever just plain value things. Rather, we take some particular valuing attitude toward
them - admiration, awe, respect, and so on” (McShane, 50). We experience it as a mediating
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valuing attitude like an emotion through which we come to see the value of something.1 This
view has a couple of connected, immediate consequences.
First, by showing that emotions can be experiences of intrinsic value, those emotions are
made more philosophically legitimate. As McShane puts this, “what we lose, then, in giving up
the concept of intrinsic value, is the prospect of an ethics that can accept the structure of many of
our most common valuing attitudes, rather than treating them as mere mistakes” (McShane, 54).
If we say we are in love with someone, we don’t mean that we love them just when they make us
dinner or when they’re there to support us, we mean that we love them for who they are. In other
words, we love them intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally. Intrinsic value, which is
usually considered something one arrives at through thinking, is also felt.
McShane’s understanding of value as experienced can give us insight into a welldocumented conflict in philosophy between feminist care ethics and intrinsic value theory. In
light of McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value, this split can be reconciled. To care
ethicists, intrinsic valuation often comes across as a cold, unfeeling calculation that doesn’t
recognize values and virtues traditionally associated with women. Among others, ecofeminist
Marti Kheel writes in the introduction to her book Nature Ethics, “I believe that terms like
‘value’ connote an economic framework by which humans rate the rest of the natural world… I
do not argue that my friends and family have intrinsic value; nor do I wish to make this argument
for other-than-humans” (Kheel, 7-8). To its critics in mainstream philosophy, care ethics is
perceived as not rigorous enough and relying too much on the emotions of the moral agent (Tong
and Williams). Care ethics allows us to be partial to the things we care about rather than relying

1

Throughout her article, McShane uses the word “attitude” to describe these experiences. I have opted to also use
the word emotion, as it better captures some of these experiences. Attitude means one’s position, opinion, or way of
being. Emotion etymologically means to be shaken up. For anyone who has been struck by an emotion like love, or
as I argue, has experienced wildness, this seems appropriate.
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on a universal code of ethics. But it would be absurd to argue that a person ever only relies
exclusively on ethical theories or their emotions.
Holmes Rolston, III, one of the most notable defenders of intrinsic value, explains
intrinsic value as an inalienable, metaphysical property of something independent of human
perception (McShane, 49). His philosophy seems to say that it’s not a matter of choice in what
we care about so much as a matter of duty-driven, deontological fact. However, Rolston
mentions care several times in his book Environmental Ethics, to the extent that he implies that
experiences of intrinsic value are why we can care. He writes, “Places that stimulate an
experience of the sublime warrant particular care, as that experience is infrequent in rebuilt
environments” (Rolston, 305) and “If natural things have values, we cannot conceivably learn
this without experiences by which we are let in on them. With every such sharing there comes a
caring…[emphases added]” (Rolston, 28) These experiences are in fact the same as McShane’s
valuing attitudes. In this way Rolston corroborates McShane’s point that intrinsic value must be
experienced and as a result of this experience, we come to care for that person or thing. Though
Rolston insists we have a duty to something because of its intrinsic value, it is only because of an
experience of that value that we can care and feel that we have some duty towards something.
Among those who explicitly comment on the controversy, Christopher Preston argues
that Rolston’s approach is not incommensurable with a care-based approach. Rolston’s
philosophy relies not only on a metaphysical understanding of intrinsic value, but also the
individual’s relationship with something that has such a value (Preston, 253). Preston follows his
students’ intuitions about this relationship and comments on their dissatisfaction with this
conflict, “While the students recognise a different emphasis they tend to see the two approaches
as different sides of the same coin rather than incompatible moral theories. 'You could not value
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something intrinsically unless you also cared about it' one student complained” (Preston, 244).
This intuition may not be consistent with strict interpretations of the other types of intrinsic value
McShane mentions, but it is consistent with hers.
While, as Kheel fears, some understandings of intrinsic value theory present the
possibility of rating and ranking the environment and creatures in it in a way that may end up
being overbearingly anthropocentric, a different understanding can alleviate this fear. What care
ethics makes explicit is the role of the emotions of the moral agent, where intrinsic value theory
rarely does. However, if we believe McShane’s claim, and I think we should, that care is deeply
entwined with what we experience as intrinsically valuable, these theories seem less combative
and more complementary.
The second result of McShane’s idea that intrinsic value is experienced is that it goes
towards making intrinsic value more relevant to a broader public. Pragmatists have for a long
time critiqued the superfluity of intrinsic value in environmental policy when, in order to protect
the environment, the focus could remain on extrinsic, instrumental value. As Andrew Light
argues, “the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of [intrinsic] value theory has pushed
environmental ethics away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to
embrace more supportive environmental views” (Light, 427). So according to Light, not only is
intrinsic value more than we need, but it is also damaging because it does not mobilize the public
to protect the environment.
However, if philosophers can accept that care and experiences of intrinsic value are
linked, philosophy can relate to a public that already has the emotional capacity to care about the
environment. It is here that McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value becomes, if you will,
instrumentally valuable. Not everyone will be well-versed in the intricacies of intrinsic value
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theory, but everyone will be familiar with love or awe or any of a number of other valuing
attitudes, and thus everyone will have experienced intrinsic value. Though it manifests in
different ways - as McShane writes, she would not love or take care of her daughter and the
Mona Lisa in the same way - it gives philosophers a common ground because an experience of
intrinsic value is its root cause (McShane, 56). This seems to be what Light suggests as a focus
“on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions that most people carry
around with them on an everyday basis” (Light, 444). In other words, we make arguments that
match most people’s experiences of value.
McShane argues for a plurality of valuing attitudes, which are familiar to us. Besides
love, she argues for awe, reverence, and respect, and does not claim her list is exhaustive. This
range of very different valuing attitudes gives us the opportunity to see intrinsic value through a
wide variety of experiences and allows for other experiences to show us intrinsic value as well.
All the valuing attitudes that McShane names - love, awe, respect, and reverence - have
the effect of decentering the observer from their self-occupied state. For example, when one
arrives at the Grand Canyon, it’s a common experience to be completely awe-stricken. In that
moment of looking out at something so grandiose, no one who is truly awe-stricken is thinking
about getting to the hotel room. No one is thinking about the gift shop. Instead, they are
completely occupied with the thing in front of them. They are valuing it directly just as it is. In a
sense, this is the essence of intrinsic value; the needs and concerns of the observer are not
relevant to the valuing. The experience of wildness, as I will argue below, is often the less
glamorous way to experience something; it is the unexpected vertigo that comes after looking
over the edge.
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In this chapter I have argued that intrinsic value, as a way to approach how we experience
and care about the world we live in, is still a relevant and important part of philosophy as well as
something we already do. Using McShane’s understanding of intrinsic value, I argued that it is
consistent with feminist care ethics because it acknowledges the role our emotions and reactions
have in determining what we value. It is also consistent with pragmatism because under
McShane’s configuration of intrinsic value, it becomes something that responds to our everyday
ways of approaching ethical problems instead of some abstract notion.
I argued that what all of McShane’s valuing attitudes have in common is a decentering of
the observer. When something is being intrinsically valued, it is being valued for its own sake,
independent of the needs or desires of the person experiencing it. Experiences of wildness are
like McShane’s other valuing attitudes insofar as there is a similar decentering of the human
observer. Yet experiences of wildness do this both more unexpectedly and in more diverse
situations, including the ones we hate to have to face. I will discuss what an experience of
wildness is like and some of the barriers to our experience of wildness in our day to day lives.

Chapter 2

In the last chapter, I argued that intrinsic value, as understood as an experience we have and
continue to have, remains relevant to environmental philosophy and our lives. This chapter is
about wildness as an experience that we have restricted to certain places.
In this chapter, I first argue that experiences of wildness do not just occur in certain
places, but can happen anywhere. Then I will discuss how philosophers of wildness often
conflate experiences of wildness with wildness itself. In other words, they experience wildness in
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the places they expect to find wildness. There is a preconceived notion about where wildness
resides, and so any experience that happens outside of this place is already marked as not wild.
Wildness, I claim, is an always present, consistent, underlying possibility and experiences of
wildness depend on the observer’s ability to perceive it. The focus on protecting wildness instead
of cultivating our ability to experience wildness reaffirms this conflation.
I will argue that our ability to experience wildness is hindered by dualisms built into our
way of thinking about what wildness is and specifically where we find it. One of the dualisms
which western philosophy has, until very recently, taken for granted is the dualism between
nature and culture. I will use Steven Vogel to discuss the relatively recent discussion of the
social construction of nature. Nature, often considered pristine and distinct and far away from
culture, is where wildness is considered to reside. Culture, within the bounds of a city, is orderly
and ruled. Vogel argues against this understanding of nature and culture on the grounds that in
reality we have so altered our environment that we can no longer distinguish between those parts
that are affected by humans and those parts that are not.
Analogously, we make distinctions between self and non-self which keep us from
experiencing our lives as wild. Even if we concede a degree of unpredictability within culture,
we rarely consider our own bodies and minds as being outside of our own understanding and
control. Similarly, we assume that we can exercise control over things that are not ourselves.
However, as I will argue, both the boundaries between culture and nature and self and non-self
are permeable and not as strict as we might want to believe.
I argue that while at times, making strong distinctions between nature and culture and self
and non-self might be reasonable, these distinctions are not helpful in understanding and
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experiencing wildness as pervasive. Rather, the boundaries keep us from realizing we are
experiencing wildness.
Experiences of wildness are, by my definition, experiences where the world exceeds our
expectations of it, temporarily disrupting any semblance of normalcy. Often this is surprising and
shocking. If this definition of experiences of wildness seems general, it is because, as I will
argue, experiences of wildness can happen anywhere. We typically consider experiences of
wildness as happening only in a narrow range of places. Though the etymological roots of
wildness may be tangled and wild themselves, they do not refer specifically to place. One
meaning is to will, specifically self-will (Snyder, 11). The surprise of wildness happens when
something ‘self-wills’ in a way that we were not expecting.
Consider the following situations. You are riding your bike downtown. In the split second
where you look over your shoulder to see if a car is coming, you lose control of the bike and
your face careens towards the pavement. This situation is not what the bike or the pavement were
meant to do. Yet in this abnormal moment, you are forced to reckon with a world that you are
not anticipating. Or perhaps you’re going for a hike, and you trip on a root on the trail and again
your face goes careening towards a rocky surface. This also isn’t the purpose of the root or the
trail. But this wildness leaps out at you and literally pulls you down to experience it. While I
don’t argue that inanimate things are actually consciously self-willing, it is clear from these
situations that the person involved is not successfully self-willing.
Though we tend to expect experiences of wildness walking through a forest or some other
natural area, perhaps the most shocking experiences of wildness happen in the places that we
consider and expect to be most tame. I have hiked many miles without having an experience with
wildlife as wild as the several times I was bit by an unleashed dog running through the park
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while the shocked owner looked on. Wildness is hardly something that is restricted to the quiet
corners of wilderness.
Steven Vogel, a philosopher that argues that wildness is not restricted to nature, and that
nature does not even exist, writes in his book Thinking Like a Mall specifically about the
wildness of artifacts and the processes that create them. Vogel argues that the entire world,
insofar as it has been so deeply affected by the actions of humans, is constructed and artifactual
at this point. By that estimation, everything that exists is an artifact (Vogel, 96-97). Important for
my purposes, Vogel says that this doesn’t exclude anything from being wild. On the contrary,
Vogel argues that everything is wild because there’s always a gap between what we expect from
something and what actually comes to be.
In an experience of wildness, the person expecting something is overtaken by what
actually is. This is not to say that Vogel’s gap disappears, but is acknowledged; we are no longer
able to presume complete control once we have seen it. In that moment, our focus has completely
gone away from a preoccupation with the self. The focus shifts outward and has moved to
consider the thing we are having a wild experience with. These experiences of wildness, just like
experiences of intrinsic value, have an element of decentering to them. Though usually we
always see ourselves as the central point of our experiences - the one doing the experiencing - in
our moments of total preoccupation with something else, that central point disappears. When that
dog bit me as I was running through the park, I was no longer occupying myself with thoughts
about doing laundry or paying bills. I came into a direct experience (in this case a confrontation)
which I was unable to ignore. Yet too often, we refuse to see these as experiences of wildness.
We draw lines to dictate what can be wild and what cannot.
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Cities are one example of how we define and draw these boundaries. Cities are
traditionally governed by laws, filled with law-abiding citizens, exclude most non-humans unless
they are useful or unavoidable. The buses and businesses run on a particular schedule. Almost
everyone has a job or designated place to be. The unpredictable things that happen in cities, such
as muggings and people sleeping on park benches, are considered deviations from the norm. The
city is an orderly place.
In writing about the conflict between the city and the wild, philosopher Martin Drenthen
talks about his home country of the Netherlands, and the threat to control that migrating wolves
pose: “The Netherlands is known as a country with one of the best organized and most wellordered spatial planning in the world. Accordingly, each newly arrived species is also being met
with planning, contingency plans, stakeholder meetings and legislation. Some believe that the
Dutch reaction to the possible arrival of the wolf shows that the Dutch simply have lost the
ability to tolerate disorderly things” (Drenthen, 329-30). The wolf here is one among many
potential symbols that represent a threat to control and order. The infiltration of the city by
something that symbolizes unusual wildness is met with the desire to control.
This understanding of the city, taken to its logical extremes, is the stuff of dystopian
novels. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We illustrates the perfect city built within the confines of a wall.
Citizens have jobs, strict timetables (according to the narrator, D-503, when the city is finally
perfect even the two hours of leisure time in the day will be occupied with something
productive), and privacy only if it is given with the permission of the authorities. Smoking or
drinking is an offense punishable by death. Development of a soul, conscience, or imagination is
considered a disease as it makes citizens restless and unruly.
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On the other side of their wall is “wild jungle.” D-503’s lover, I-330, not coincidentally
shortened to “I” as opposed to “We”, breaks a hole in the wall allowing an unexpected flood of
animals and greenery into the perfectly sterile city (Zamyatin, 203). Similar intrusions of
wildness are also present in the later works 1984 by George Orwell and Brave New World by
Aldous Huxley. The novels should illustrate that in our imaginations, wildness is entangled with
a kind of unrestrained freedom that means more than any legal freedoms of the city.
Since the beginning of human settlements, wildness has been cast out of the city in the
minds of its inhabitants as dangerous and chaotic. But in the overwhelmingly ordered cities of
these dystopian works the infiltration of wildness offers hope and highlights the problems of
control and lack of genuine freedom within the state. They also show that all these dystopian
thinkers conceive of wildness as something inextinguishable. Even though in all three novels the
primary stimulus of rebellion is from outside the main character, it strikes a chord within him
that resonates with latent doubts and inclinations toward freedom.
But this wildness does not need to be experienced as coming from the world outside of
the city. Steven Vogel believes we live in a wild world both in and out of the city. It is wild
because, regardless of which parts we intentionally created and which parts we did not, we have
thoroughly affected the world and despite this, it continues to exceed our expectations for it.
Vogel argues that it is the world itself that is actually, at least in part, materially constructed by
humans, but this doesn’t prohibit it from being wild (Vogel, 34-36).
This also has effects on our ideas of the proper way to act in civilization. If we believe in
a nature that only exists in places far away from us, and that we have a duty to protect and secure
it at all costs, Vogel argues that we “have nothing to say about what happens on this side of the
boundary (which is where by definition we actually live), leaving us curiously free to engage in
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any environmental depredations we wish to undertake here. [original emphasis]” (Vogel, 13) To
truly understand our causal responsibility for our world, we have to consider it all on equal
ground. Protecting wildness as a component of nature out there and far away will not help us get
to the roots of our environmental problems. Unlike some of the writers below, Vogel doesn’t
write about wildness as if it’s a metaphysical quality. For Vogel, wildness is a material fact,
meaning that forces in the world (such as gravity, time, etc.) work on things regardless of human
beings, and for him this is wildness. However, all of the thinkers below share with Vogel an
understanding of wildness as eluding human control and anticipation.
Tom Birch, in defending wildness against the control of the state, calls into question the
efforts of American preservationists to set aside wilderness areas. He writes that this is an effort
by the imperium to bring wildness under the realm of human control. Even though the wilderness
areas are not governed by the same laws as the city, he describes them as an attempt to “bring
law to the wildness” (Birch 1990, 7). “Self-determination is not permitted for nature” in these
wilderness areas, which Birch sees as prisons (Birch 1990, 5). Still, Birch claims that it would be
a mistake to take wildness’ manifestations for wildness itself, even if means we lose sight of
wildness when these manifestations are destroyed, wildness persists somewhere (Birch 1990, 9).
Birch writes that a body of power needs to maintain wildness as something to control to
reify the necessity of the regulating body and the danger to the imperium if this is not
accomplished: “When we see the real otherness that is there beneath the imperium’s version of it,
beneath all the usual categories of use and value, then we see an otherness that can never be fully
described, understood or appropriated, and the entire edifice of the imperium is called into
question…” (Birch 1990, 20). However if wildness cannot be contained, it is also present within
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the imperium and can, as Birch describes in a later work discussed in chapter three, penetrate our
experiences of wildness in the imperium.
If we are in fact all under the imperium, humans and wilderness areas alike, where does
wildness hide when we lose sight of it? Even though manifestations of wildness can be
exterminated, Birch says, “wildness, which contradicts any finalization in identification, is… at
the heart of any living self or society [original emphasis]” (Birch 1990, 11). It’s hard to know
what “living” means for Birch. If the efforts of the imperium to capture wildness are ultimately
deceptive and illusory, it’s not actually that the capturing is harmful to wildness. If wildness is
truly inextirpable, there’s little reason for Birch to pay any mind to the imperium’s desire to
capture and rule it. What Birch really fears in the imperium is how it hinders our ability to
experience wildness, not its hobbling of wildness itself. Yet he focuses only on the imperium’s
attempts to contain wildness rather than any attempts it might make to keep us from experiencing
it.
These fears are echoed and reaffirmed in the work of Jack Turner. In “The Abstract Wild:
A Rant” Turner conflates wilderness and wildness, assuming that the loss of the former means
the loss of the latter. He writes, “unless we can radically transform modern civilization, the
wilderness and its people will be but a memory in the minds of a few people. When they die, it
will die with them, and the wild will become completely abstract” (Turner, 32). It seems that
Turner makes the category mistake that Birch warns of. He assumes that if we can truly
extinguish the wild nature of any of wildness’ manifestations, that is if we don’t experience it in
them, it means the extinguishing of wildness itself.
Turner is responding not only to a loss of wildness, but to a claim that wildness can be
captured and visited whenever someone desires. This alleged capture of wildness deceives us
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into thinking we need not worry about protecting the environment. Wildness is in a pen at the
zoo, over there. Turner speculates that what we are trying to save, and what we have failed
miserably in saving, is a sense of our home as wild (Turner, 35). Turner hopes for a radical
transformation of modern civilization that will keep wildness from becoming abstract. Yet,
contra Turner, wildness so eludes control that we really needn’t fear its disappearance. Wildness
could only become abstract if we totally and irreversibly fail to experience it. In both their
defenses of wildness, Birch and Turner presuppose that the conflict is between an abstract
civilization and wildness, rather than focusing on some inner conflict within the people who live
there which keeps them from the experience.
Writer Jay Griffiths, author of Wild: An Elemental Journey, travels the world looking for
wildness as she assumes it persists primarily in indigenous cultures. The only part of her story
that takes place in her native United Kingdom is when she makes arrangements to get out of it.
She writes of the cities she visits (merely as stopovers to the next wild place) as dirty and
grotesque and bemoans the effects they have had on indigenous culture. Though this critique is
fair, she refuses (to experience) any genuine wildness in the city. Griffiths writes, “We are
animal in our blood and in our skin. We were not born for pavements and escalators but for
thunder and mud. More. We are animal not only in body but in spirit” (Griffiths, 84).
Yet we are social animals, and in our numbers it is not surprising we have taken to living
in these large, complex collectives. She does describe a few symptoms of wildness in human
culture (meaning outside of the indigenous communities she visits): “It is the first ‘fuck’ on
television, it simmers in the feral intoxication of jazz, it explodes exuberant in carnival…”
(Griffiths, 85). These experiences read as momentary intrusions of wildness, rather than a
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persistent existence of it. In her glorification of wildness in the indigenous settlements she visits,
Griffiths disparages the lives most of us live.
But I think there’s an alternative to this divisive notion that wildness only exists in
wilderness or so-called natural areas. We can revel in wildness when we go for a morning walk
through the city and something surprises us; we should also be glad when we have luxury to sit
down on a bench or drink at a water fountain. Perhaps in the past it has been necessary to shun
culture to show the importance of wilderness. However, the thinkers above have overcorrected
and their love of wildness is assumed to be mutually exclusive with any love of culture.
There is inconsistency in these philosophers of the wild. They critique humans for
destroying wildness with their culture, yet they describe wildness as something resilient that,
despite the tremendous human impact on the environment, continues to survive. They critique
human society for its lack of wildness yet provide no suggestions for its improvement. To answer
both claims, I suggest that rather than keeping our focus outward on vast landscapes that we
consider the last vestiges of the wild, we look inward and really examine how we can learn to
experience ourselves and the world as wild.
Seemingly agreeing with other wildness philosophers, Gary Snyder writes, “‘the
world’, with the exception of a tiny bit of human intervention, is ultimately a wild place,”
implying that the places where there is human intervention are antithetical to wildness.
He adds, “we can say that New York City and Tokyo are ‘natural’ but not ‘wild.’ They do
not deviate from the laws of nature, but they are habitat so exclusive in the matter of who
and what they give shelter to, and so intolerant of other creatures, as to be truly odd”
(Snyder, 12).
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Yet later, he softens this by saying, “civilization is permeable, and could be
inhabited as the wild is.” Echoing Birch, he remarks on the inexorability of wildness,
“Wilderness may temporarily dwindle, but wildness won’t go away” (Snyder, 16). It
seems Snyder’s view of a full, robust wildness is to some degree truncated at the city line
too. However, he writes that humans are more wild than they think. He writes that “to
resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild, we must first resolve to be whole”
(Snyder, 24). The mere possibility of this resolution distinguishes Snyder from other
defenders of wildness.
Despite his misgivings about civilization, Snyder states that we are always wild
more clearly than others have:
Our bodies are wild. The involuntary quick turn of the head at a shout, the vertigo at
looking off a precipice, the heart-in-the-throat in a moment of danger, the catch of the
breath, the quiet moments relaxing, staring, reflecting - all universal responses of this
mammal body… The world is our consciousness and it surrounds us. There are more
things in mind, in the imagination, than ‘you’ can keep track of - thoughts, memories,
images, angers, delights, rise unbidden. The depths of mind, the unconscious, are our
inner wilderness areas, and that is where a bobcat is right now (Snyder, 17).

This claim differs from most of western philosophy. It states that not only is the outside
world wild, but we ourselves are wild in both our bodies and minds. To resolve to be
whole is to accept wildness as something familiar, literally in the family. It is something
that does not exist exclusively outside the city.
There are practical, useful physical barriers which we maintain between ourselves
and the stuff outside of us, whether those barriers are city limits or the bodies that need to
be distinguished between other bodies to keep them from running into each other. Yet we
would be mistaken if we consider those boundaries impermeable, immutable, and solid.
The person who disagrees with this will have to reckon with the trillions of bacteria
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inhabiting them. In a very real sense, our bodies do not belong only to us. Our minds, too,
are like this and, as Snyder suggests, not completely within our control or understanding.
Wildness can never be extinguished because our own wildness within us is so deep that it
can never even be fathomed.
Even in seemingly tame, non-wild entities, there is wildness and capability to
experience it. Snyder defines this as “perennially within us, dormant as a hard-shelled
seed, awaiting the fire or flood that wakes it again” (Snyder, 14). The wildness is there,
but we lack the eyes to see it. Snyder’s book Practice of the Wild is about exactly that - a
practice that encourages the latent ability in us to see wildness to take root and grow,
transforming the world around us.
What I have hoped to show in the preceding pages is that because of our inability
to experience wildness in the world and in ourselves, because we view it as something
that exists in some far away place, person, or other entity, we are not able to understand
wildness as a possible quality of all our experiences.
I argued that past defenders of wildness have made arguments and expressed fears
that only reaffirm these dualisms between nature and culture that Steven Vogel is arguing
against by trying to protect a wildness that exists in nature that has been killed in
civilization. They have assumed that wildness resides outside of city limits because they
conflate wildness with experiences of wildness. Defenders of wildness, despite good
intentions, are still operating within this paradigm. Similarly, the dualism between self
and non-self tends to reify an understanding of the self as a known, controlled entity, like
a city, cordoned off from the rest of the world.
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Ultimately, the pursuit of protecting wildness is wrongheaded because wildness is
so inalienable and uncontrollable that we never have to worry about it disappearing. This
is not to say that the places we consider wild are not worth preserving. Wilderness areas
are still worth protecting. They too are wild and can train our experience of wildness. But
to appreciate wilderness areas only for a wildness that we can find nowhere else is a
mistake on our part. As humans trying to connect to and learn to care for an increasingly
troubled world, experiencing wildness offers us an opportunity to confront the things in
life that are not us yet nonetheless demand our attention.
In the next section, I will discuss how we might learn to be more open to
experiences of intrinsic value and wildness in our day to day lives. The nature of wildness
is such that we can never anticipate when these experiences will strike. I will argue for
and discuss the potential for consciously opening ourselves up to similar experiences.

Chapter 3

Experiences of intrinsic value and wildness will always be a possibility in our lives. They come
to us unexpectedly and force us to reckon with something that we did not happen to notice
before. There will always be the opportunity for wild experiences, because we will always find
ourselves in situations we weren’t paying attention to before. Startling, heart-stopping,
adrenaline-fueled experiences of wildness demand our attention. But in this section, I will argue
for the ways this attention can and should be freely given.
I start by returning to Birch, who should not be thrown out with the bathwater.
Specifically, I review Birch’s understanding of moral consideration. Birch believes that the
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pursuit of an adequate criteria for moral consideration has been a pursuit of western domination,
much like the goal of restricting wildness to wilderness areas. He offers instead the idea of
universal moral considerability, which is to say paying attention to all things actively before we
undertake any activities which would affect them. He offers the term “deontic experience” to
describe an encounter with something which leaves us with the feeling of what we must do.
Birch is far from giving us concrete guidelines for understanding exactly how to become
considerate of things in our daily lives. I expand on Birch’s philosophy by following his implicit
and explicit references to Zen Buddhism. I view Zen through the lens of Gary Snyder, whose life
and work have been immensely influenced by practicing Zen. I argue that he can provide a
clearer understanding of what it means to undertake and fully commit to Birch’s deontic
experience in everyday life.
I offer this practice of Zen as a way for us to live a life full of caring attention. Instead of
the usual ethical propensity for constantly expanding on which beings we give moral
consideration to, the approach of Birch and Zen is to start from the consideration of all things
and consistently move inward towards those beings which we have ethical responsibilities to.
I will conclude this chapter by returning to Katie McShane and intrinsic value. I will
argue that universal moral consideration is a way of understanding how best to care for the world
around us. I argue that this care is the same care that Katie McShane talks about. By virtue of the
fact that the world is able to call to us to take some action towards it is a sufficient condition for
us to care for and experience it as intrinsically valuable. Though experiencing intrinsic value
does not necessarily have anything to say about our ethical obligations to beings and things in the
world, it is a reason to at least regard them carefully.
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Tom Birch’s article “Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration” is the sequel to
“The Incarceration of Wildness” appearing three years later. It illustrates an optimism not seen in
“The Incarceration of Wildness.” While it still focuses on the imperium’s attempt to corral and
categorize the unfamiliar, it also offers a hopeful alternative in the form of universal
consideration, which entails giving all things, including the non-sentient and inanimate, at the
very least a basic consideration before acting in a way that would affect them.
Birch begins by critiquing the standard formulation of moral consideration, quoting
Kenneth Goodpaster: “For all A, X deserves moral consideration from A.[..when X meets
specific, preordained necessary and sufficient conditions.]” (qtd. in Birch 1993, 314). He writes
that this formulation shows the inherent imperialism of the western philosophical project of
designating moral value. It does this by virtue of the fact that the people assessing the moral
value of something come up with the necessary and sufficient criteria before encountering the
specific candidate for moral value thus effectively shutting off the possibility for some things
before they’re even encountered. The project presupposes that the criteria for moral
considerability are right. Birch’s goal in his essay is not to develop a new criteria, but to
completely deconstruct the question of moral considerability itself (Birch 1993, 314).
He regards the question as completely nestled in a context of western thought, which
denies moral regard to some beings for a variety of arbitrary reasons, for example sentience or
rationality. This particular way of viewing the nonhuman world is not, Birch argues, necessarily
the standard. He writes:
Certainly in many cultures moral considerability has been afforded to nonhuman beings of various
sorts, and even in our own culture there are many people who do give consideration to
nonhumans, such as wild animals, trees, mountains, wilderness, and farmland. Of course, their
voices are generally marginalized. This essay may be viewed as an attempt to give voice to this
marginalized sensibility in a way that mandates its being heard (Birch 1993, 317).
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Not only is the predominant understanding of moral considerability culturally contextual; it is
also historically contextual, as the range of beings and things considered worthy of moral
consideration has continued to shift and expand. Where once we might have only (or at least
most highly) morally considered rich, white men, we then began allowing poor, white men,
nonwhite peoples, and women, among others, though this struggle continues.2 And in some
cases, we start making ethical room for the moral considerability of nonhuman animals and even
entire ecosystems whether they include human beings or not. We seek finitude and completion;
this pursuit thus far has proven to be wrongheaded.
Since, through the course of history, there have been so many beings up for
reconsideration, Birch wonders why we even need to close the discussion about which beings (or
even things) are morally considerable. The lesson we should learn from our history is that our
comfortable self-assurances about which beings we consider objectively morally considerable
are subject to change and not objective whatsoever. They keep developing as we are forced to
reconsider other beings and things.
The crux of Birch’s argument is that before we can ever even evaluate our moral
obligations to another being, we must consider the being. This encounter comes first and
foremost regardless of what ethical obligations we have formed because of them. Birch writes,
“the most fundamental job of the entire business of ethical research is the discovery of our
obligations. Nevertheless, it is not possible to discover our obligations to others, of whatever
sort, unless and until we give them moral consideration” (Birch 1993, 322). Consideration is a
necessary step before we can even evaluate our obligations.

2

Birch writes, “wise and enlightened people already treat other people as human beings until it is proved otherwise there is no a priori requirement for another person to prove his or her worth. Universal consideration requires the
extension of the same attitude toward the nonhuman world.” pp. 328 - 329.
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Birch introduces the term deontic experience to define experiences where a person is
drawn to someone or something, filling the person with the urge that they must do something.
Birch writes that this experience, which is the point of origin in our experience of ethical
obligations, is what inspires us to act according to our ethical beliefs. While the deontic
experience could be strong, it does not necessarily determine our obligations towards something.
Deontic experience is rooted in intuition and feeling, not just logic. This can be misleading and
requires further philosophical inquiry, but is a necessary starting point. We can have deontic
experiences without ethical obligations, but we cannot, Birch argues, have ethical obligations
without our prior deontic experiences.
Birch describes these experiences as “generated out of a relationship with any kind of
entity: persons, things, systems, ecosystems, other sorts of abstractions, even numbers” (Birch
1993, 323). And while it doesn’t imply that we necessarily have ethical obligations to any of
these things, it does imply that we can have a relationship of some kind with all of the above
things. These are relationships which may very well create ethical obligations where we may not
have seen them before. They are what we turn to when “we are pressed to explain and justify,
and prove to others, our ethical judgments and practices. We turn to them in the course of our
own deliberations, to test and prove practical ethical hypotheses” (Birch 1993, 323). These very
intuitive interactions and reactions to the world around us are the fundamental way we shape our
future interactions with it.
Birch says that we usually do not grasp the implications of deontic experiences
immediately and that they might take years to develop more fully. The experience is sudden, but
what it means for the development of our ethics is unclear at first. At the moment of the deontic
experience, however, we usually “know at some level that something has happened that will
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have to be reckoned with sooner or later” (Birch 1993, 324). Ethics, as our way of thinking
through the implications of our behavior, is that reckoning.
Birch advocates a refining of our capacity to consciously recognize deontic experiences
as they happen. He writes, somewhat mystically, “Whetted to the point of the ideal, which we
might call the point of perfect virtue - a flawless spontaneity - the practice of giving
consideration would be the continuous realization of the epiphany of every moment” (Birch
1993, 324). He invokes Thoreau’s practice of walking and Zen’s practice of mindfulness as
manifestations of this practice. Taken with those practices, what Birch means is far from
mystical; he means only that in a perfect world, we would consider beings actively and selflessly
at all times. He writes that when such epiphanic moments come as a result of deontic experience,
we realize “part of what it is to be a human being” (Birch 1993, 324). Specifically, we realize
things as not just part of the human world, but also humans as part of the rest of the world.
He states that if it were possible to cultivate this perfect practice that made consideration
and attention central, we may be able to dispense with ethics. Ethics and how it tells us to
consider other beings is, as Birch shows, an imperfect, constantly changing, historically and
culturally contingent set of rules. Consideration and reconsideration always yields to these
changes and therefore never falls into the problem that ethics does of moral backpedaling from
strict, uncompromising ethical positions. Dispensing with ethics is, however, only possible
“given a sufficiently honed practice of attentiveness to others, given the perfect virtue mentioned
above, given the perhaps infallible spontaneity of enlightenment” (Birch 1993, 329). Again Birch
seems to tread near to the mystical. However, his goal is not to abolish ethics as the perfection
above remains elusive. His goal is to show that this attentiveness is at the root of any of our
moral intuitions and if we persisted in such a state, we would be consistently considerate of and
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attentive to other beings. He merely tries to point to the fact that ethics fails, time and again, as
we begin to consider or reconsider beings that we didn’t before.
Birch summons up, both explicitly and implicitly, Zen Buddhism through his discussion
of mindfulness and enlightenment. This brings in an element of deontic experience that Birch
doesn’t explicitly focus on, but is consistent with the rest of his discussion of attentiveness. This
element is a lack of focus on the self, and it is an explicitly Buddhist notion that is required for
both mindfulness (or Birch’s concentration and attentiveness) and subsequent enlightenment.
The root of Birch’s problem is not the lack of attentiveness; we are always attentive to
something. It is that we are often attentive to the self that we define by its rational thinking mind
and its collection of thoughts and ethical beliefs that we consider constant and unchanging. The
proper attention that Birch is advocating cannot be achieved by a merely intellectual
understanding or encounter with something. It is an encounter that does not put the thing apart
from the observer.
Gary Snyder comments on this attachment to the thinking mind and its inability to let the
rest of the world in. He quotes the Genjōkōan, a 12th century Zen Buddhist text by Zen master
Dōgen Zenji. “‘We study the self to forget the self,’ said Dōgen. ‘When you forget the self, you
become one with the ten thousand things.’ Ten thousand things means all of the phenomenal
world. When we are open that world can occupy us. Yet we are still called on to wrestle with the
curious phenomenon of the complex human self, needed but excessive, which resists letting the
world in” (Snyder, 160). When we have Birch’s deontic experience or a wild experience, 3 it is a

3

Birch’s deontic experience is different from the wild experience insofar as wildness refers to a quality of the
experience (that it is unexpected, etc) and deontic refers to the implications of the experience (that one must do
something). They are far from mutually exclusive. The wildness of the experience hits immediately while its deontic
implications usually take time to develop.
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moment where the world has occupied us, subverting the immediate interests we have in
ourselves.
Our pigeonholing of which beings are morally considerable is closely linked to our
pigeonholing of which places and things are wild. We presuppose the right criteria before we
give something the opportunity to show itself to us. Snyder writes on this, and how best we
should open ourselves to the world. “Mountaineers climb peaks for the great view, the
cooperation and comradeship, the lively hardship - but mostly because it puts you out there
where the unknown happens, where you encounter surprise [original emphasis].” This unknown,
surprising encounter is, of course, an experience of wildness. We find mountains considerable
because of, among other reasons, the wildness we easily experience there. Snyder continues,
“The truly experienced person, the refined person, delights in the ordinary [original emphasis]”
(Snyder, 164). By delimiting the bounds of what we can experience wildness in, we
simultaneously do harm to ourselves and the rest of the world. To open the whole world up as
something we can experience wildness in, and intrinsic value for that matter, means to be able to
find those things in anything we encounter or are doing.
The epiphanic moments Birch writes about when we reach this union with reality, where
we are no longer keeping it at arm’s length but embracing it as part of our bodies and minds, is
enlightenment. Snyder writes, “What we didn’t perhaps see so clearly was that self-realization,
even enlightenment, is another aspect of our wildness - a bonding of the wild in ourselves to the
(wild) process of the universe” (Snyder, xi).
This all may sound very nice, but difficult. One need not commit to any complicated
metaphysics to undertake the practice of paying careful attention to the world. Birch was right to
associate Thoreau’s practice of walking with the Zen practice of mindfulness. These ways of
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experiencing reality are not limited to these varieties of the practice of attention. These are not
metaphysical practices, but rather they are rooted in the physical world that is actually happening
around the observer. Snyder writes that Zen is mostly practice; he says that much of the theory
that one associates with Zen in particular and Buddhism in general is hazardous insofar as it
leads people to rely on something other than their direct experience (Snyder, ix).
This practice of mindfulness, which is freely giving our attention to things in our lives,
allows direct experience of the world. This takes time to develop. One way to develop this is
meditation. Meditation is central when beginning Zen practice. Sitting still, without much outside
stimulation, allows us to more clearly observe our thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and sensations.
These are things that separate the self from the world around it. The goal of mindfulness is not to
stop seeing things in this way or to totally dismiss them, but to pay attention to the rest of the
world as well. This is illustrated in a Zen story:

Nan-in was visited by Tenno, who, having passed his apprenticeship, had become a teacher. The
day happened to be rainy, so Tenno wore wooden clogs and carried an umbrella. After greeting
him Nan-in remarked: “I suppose you left your wooden clogs in the vestibule. I want to know if
your umbrella is on the right or left side of the clogs.” Tenno, confused, had no instant answer. He
realized that he was unable to carry his Zen every minute (Reps and Senzaki, 52-53).

In this story, even the experienced Zen practitioner’s mind was sufficiently occupied that
he was not able to pay attention even to what he was doing himself. Privileging the thinking
mind over the things we do in our day to day lives only continue to keep us separate from what
Buddhists call the ten thousand things and the whole phenomenal universe (Snyder, 105). It
certainly also shows a lack of universal consideration.
But we don’t need to buy black robes and sit in full lotus posture all day chanting the
heart sutra in a meditation hall in Japan for 12 years to experience mindfulness. We need to
merely find ourselves capable of observing our reactions and realizing how we already move
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through the world. As Birch said, Thoreau’s process of doing this was walking, a literal moving
through the world. To encounter the world and even have the opportunity to consciously morally
consider it, we have to be in it, with it, and open to it. Birch quotes Zen master Shunryu Suzuki,
“Mindfulness is… wisdom. By wisdom we do not mean some particular faculty or philosophy. It
is the readiness of the mind that is wisdom… Wisdom is something which will come out of your
mindfulness. So the point is to be ready for observing things, and to be ready for thinking. This is
called emptiness of your mind” (qtd. in Birch 1993, 324). It’s to come to something without the
preconceived notions of what it’s good for and how it matters ethically.
Universal consideration, whether as a practice derived from Zen or some other place, is
the most basic amount of care we should give to the world we live in; it is, to use Katie
McShane’s words, a claim “about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that
thing” (McShane, 43). And we need to care about the world, because we are part and parcel with
it. Birch writes, “the nonhuman, as well as the human, world is valued and is preserved, in part,
because it does make deep consideration, mindfulness, and attentiveness possible and meaningful
[original emphasis]” (Birch, 331).
What Zen, universal consideration, experiences of wildness, and experiences of intrinsic
value have in common is that they focus on experiencing the world carefully and just as it is,
apart from the self and any of its concerns. Just as Snyder said Zen practice can often become the
victim of too much theory, intrinsic value often does as well. If we understand intrinsic value not
as some esoteric metaphysical property of the natural world but, as McShane does, as something
that we do every day already, it can resolve many of its philosophical problems while also
philosophically legitimating the way we already interact with the world. Experiences of wildness
demand our attention whenever they happen. They bring things immediately, if temporarily, to
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the forefront of our lives, shifting the focus from ourselves. These experiences of wildness are
important and will always astound us with their unexpected suddenness. We can also give our
consideration and attention to the world freely, whether it’s through Zen meditation, or walking,
or any of the other practices that encourage this consideration.
If we allow for the possibility of experiencing value through this careful attention, an
inability to experience the value in something is no longer something lacking in that thing. The
lack is in us. We can now reinterpret a quote mentioned in chapter one from Holmes Rolston, III:
“Places that stimulate an experience of the sublime warrant particular care, as that experience is
infrequent in rebuilt environments” (Rolston, 305). In light of what has been said here about
experiences of wildness and intrinsic value, we can say that since the experience of wildness is
infrequent in rebuilt environments, we should enact universal consideration and undertake
practices that stimulate this experience. It is experience, not something independent of it, that
causes an experience of intrinsic value and a basic level of care.

Conclusion

What I have sought to show here is that the role of our human experience in specifically
environmental ethics and philosophy in general has been underappreciated. What Katie
McShane’s work has shown is that we experience intrinsic value only through the experiences
that show us the value of something. What Tom Birch and McShane share is the idea that
regardless of all of our ethical theories, before we think about the world we experience it directly
and this experience informs everything else. This is invaluable to ethics because it means few, if
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any, of our ways of valuing the world are unmediated. We can’t help but value the world through
some experience.
For the most part, we decide how those experiences happen. For example, we’re unable
to believe our world is wild. Because of our preconceived notions of where, when, and with what
wildness happens we only experience it through the violent, demanding experiences described
above. Experiences of wildness demand our attention only in situations where we weren’t
already giving it freely.
A world where we undertake practices that teach us how to give our attention freely have
the opportunity to change our way of experiencing the world we live in. While as described these
practices require a person’s experience, they are decentering in the sense that they do not give the
person a superiority over the thing they are encountering. The person may make ethical decisions
after the fact, but in the moment of that the experience happens, the person is considering
something just as it is.
We cannot just consider the world and the things in it when they are instrumentally
valuable to us. Paying attention to all things, including the ones that are uncomfortable,
inconvenient, or just undesirable, helps to make us more thoughtful citizens of the world, whose
lives, as Birch noted, are made more meaningful by paying attention to the other things in it
(Birch, 1993, 331).
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